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ABSTRACT 
 
This project work addresses recent critical developments in the Europe after financial 
crisis 2008. As Unemployment is in rise, austerity policies are installed on European 
level in order to counteract. Through a critical approach, backed up by Keynesian 
understandings of macroeconomics, these developments are evaluated in order to 
explore the interrelation between Neoliberalism and Unemployment in Europe. Due to 
the macroeconomic and critical theoretical understanding behind this analysis, recent 
policies have to be contextualized to global imbalances in production and consumption 
and Neoliberal transformation since the 80s’.  
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 6 
Introduction 
 
Autumn 2008 was a decisive point for global political economy, and since the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, Neoliberalism is under pressure. This pressure is due to a recession 
on global scale, and the severe challenges it brought about, particularly for the European 
Union (EU). Most recently unemployment sets the frame for political conflict in Europe, 
accelerating towards violence on the streets of Spain and Greece. This project work 
discusses the crucial challenge of unemployment for Neoliberalism in Europe in a 
critical way, asking for causes and tendencies between unemployment and neoliberal 
structures in Europe. 
Europe’s neoliberal turn and consolidation has been described to a larger extend 
at other occasions (Bieler & Morton 2001, Buch-Hansen 2011). With the rise of 
neoliberal crisis 2007 (Apeldoorn & Overbeck 2012), scholars of heterodox political 
economy came to claim that neoclassical theory, academically supporting neoliberal 
transformations, failed to provide appropriate theoretical frameworks to capture ‘real 
world’ economy (Kaletsky 2011; Helleiner 2011; Jespersen 2011; Davidson 2012). Thus, 
this project work argues that explanations for recent unemployment should not be 
deduced out of a neoclassical general equilibrium model (Ohanian 2010), but are to be 
found within a more open and reflexive epistemology. Robert W. Cox’ critical theory 
provides such a broader view. Furthermore, according to Keynesian understandings of 
causes for crisis, Neoliberalism in Europe has to be contextualized to global imbalances 
in production and consumption, creating a lack of sufficient demand on global scale 
(Elsenhans 2006; Schwartz 2009; Davidson 2009; Stiglitz 2010; Blackburn 2011; Tridico 
2012). Within this global trend of under-consumption, structural conditions might then 
be found to provoke rising unemployment rates, recently exacerbating this rise by 
austerity policies. 
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Problem formulation 
 
For a society driven and shaped by the principle of exchange, unemployment is an 
always-present threat, since only incomes can guarantee people access to commodity 
markets. In the worst case people without employment cannot satisfy their basic needs, 
like food, shelter and transport. In industrialized countries these necessities might still 
be provided by social security structures, but psychological depression or social 
isolation can hurt people experiencing long time unemployment in likewise problematic 
ways. Whatever mediating role welfare states might be able to play in regard to 
unemployment, the underlying principle of production for exchange remains the same 
since the very beginning of modern society, causing contradictions and political 
confrontations (Marx 2008). Today, a very present contradiction of globalized exchange 
relations can be observed on the streets of Greece and Spain. Mostly young people, 
disillusioned by youth unemployment rates up to 49.9% (Eurostat 2012), lose reliance 
on the political economic system in rule. As mass unemployment threatens an increasing 
number of economies in the European Monetary Union (EMU), political pressure to 
counteract grows.   
But although rising unemployment rates since crisis 2008 have outraged people 
in several European countries suffering of recession, Neoliberalism has not always 
worked in such exclusionary way as now observable. Neoliberal Europe did not solely 
experience growing unemployment rates. Especially in the eve of crisis, unemployment 
rates on European scale have been reduced significantly between 2005 and 2008, as 
Figure 1 shows. It is now, with the financial crisis, that unemployment rates have been in 
a dramatic rise. In order to understand recent conflicts, causes as well as policies to 
counteract unemployment have to be grasped. Need for such a conceptual discussion 
becomes quite apparent when monetary policies by the European community are 
accused to have a negative outcome on growth and employment in general (Lacina & 
Kapounek 2009), and especially after crisis (ILO 2012, 50-52). The ambivalence of this 
relation between Neoliberalism and employment rates is thus in the focus of this project 
work. But since analytical tools in regard to economic performances are to be chosen 
with caution after the uncertainty crisis brought with, a major part of the project 
addresses the quest to elaborate on a theoretical framework for today’s global political 
economy, and its interconnectedness with the happenings in Europe. In short, this 
project work aims to explore effects of Neoliberal policies on employment by applying 
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experimental theoretical frameworks. To do so, a rather broad research question will be 
followed.  What is the relationship between Neoliberal Europe and unemployment? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis is undertaken on European level. Subsuming the variety of states, welfare 
concepts, labor markets or even different so-called regulation regimes and varieties of 
capitalism under one umbrella might not seem to be the most promising approach in the 
first place. Differences in between the member states are especially apparent if 
unemployment rates are rendered into national economies; see Figure 2. But despite an 
undeniable diversity of shape 
members of the EU have, 17 
states do share one central 
commonality: the Euro. This 
sets a crucial common frame 
for the development of unem-
ployment rates, prefacing the 
actual variety in performance. 
By discussing Keynesian 
understandings of monetary 
politics, Gills comment that ‘the Achilles heel of the European political economy, and one 
of the principal costs of the neo-liberal, market-monetarist austerity policies is 
Figure 1, Unemployment on European scale, source: Eurostat 2012. 
Figure 2, Unemployment rates by EMU Member States, 
source: Eurostat 2012. 
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persistent mass unemployment’ (2011, 48) will become understandable, and gives a 
theoretical frame to have a look at crisis policies in an not so often discussed way.  
Since this project work aims to contribute to a deeper understanding for recent crisis 
policies in Europe, a broader historical contextualization will have to be given. By 
outlining the history of monetary integration in Europe, Neoliberalism, and its 
institutionalization of orthodox assumptions on monetary policies can be identified. 
With a discussion of Keynesian understanding on money beforehand, the crucial role a 
common currency plays for (un)employment in the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
will be revealed. After crisis, controversially, austerity polices do not seem to give quick 
answers to the rising unemployment rates on European scale, as reflected in the graph 
(Figure 1). Once implemented, they are applied in order to secure prosperity in a nearer 
future, but demand austerity for the present. This project work questions the very 
assumptions on which such a thought is being justified. The strong doubt on austerity 
policies is due to the argument that globalization is shaped by under-consumption 
threats, asking for macroeconomic management on global scale. When austerity can be 
rejected by Keynesian arguments and historical analysis, any economic determinism for 
austerity policies is rejected. Consequently, the role of ideology becomes much more 
central. This thought will now be explicated in the following theoretical unit. 
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Theory 
 
Revising global political economy literature after crisis 2008, Helleiner concludes that 
‘more comprehensive analytical tools to explain global financial crisis’ (2011, 87) have 
to be developed. Besides the doubts on dominant models in economics (Kaletsky 2011, 
Davidson 2010), also the ‘globalized’ interrelations of exchange and social life suggest 
the need for a broader theoretical approach used so far. Analytical eclecticism offers an 
approach to cope with the complex interrelations found in today’s world economy. As a 
starting point for such an eclectic theory, a methodology originating from Marxist 
theoretical concepts, namely historical materialism, is one way to approach European 
economic performance under Neoliberalism. To grasp recent economic developments in 
the EMU, Keynesian thoughts are implemented into this broader, Marxian inspired 
critical reflection, taking up on a theoretical model conceptualized by one central figure 
of the so-called English school of International Political Economy: Robert W. Cox.  
 Before this concept can be developed, first of all, the here used understanding of 
Neoliberalism is to be clarified. David Harvey draws his ‘Brief history of Neoliberalism’ 
(2005) by taking the crisis for capital accumulation in the 70s’ and 80s’ of last century as 
the starting point of what he calls the ‘Neoliberal turn’. Consequently, Neoliberalism can 
be seen as a ‘political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and 
to restore the power of economic elites’ (ibid. 19). The talk of ‘re-establishment’ is only 
understandable if the juncture of departure for Harvey’s ‘brief history’ is seen as a time 
of accumulation crisis, resulting out of a not any longer sustainable class consensus 
prevailing since welfare state as Keynesian project. Welfare states worked as a 
redistribution system in favor for full-employment, and social security in economic 
terms, but confronted inflation and unemployment during the 70s’, the so-called 
stagflation. Moreover, tax rates up to 90 per cent for the most wealthy, and relative 
egalitarian share in wealth distribution throughout the national economies in the west 
shaped the decades before the rise of Neoliberalism, provoked a counter project of 
elites. 
 With the constraints on elites of these planned, state-led welfare economies, then, 
it was rather unsurprising that a counter project of the very same elites has been 
established, breaking the class consensus in favor of domination. Although Harvey 
admits that the concept of class ‘is always a somewhat shadowy (some would even say 
dubious) concept’ (ibid. 31), he argues that Neoliberalism has to be understood as a 
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class driven project. The specific class in favor of Neoliberalism pushed forward a 
project of financialization, in which stock values and investment returns replaced prior 
dominating considerations of productivity. This process not only facilitated flows of 
capital over state borders, but also let transnational corporations rise as central 
economic entity ruling in Neoliberlism. Provided with the legal status of a person, these 
globalized corporations ‘became more and more financial in their orientation’ (ibid.) 32, 
and thus supported the Neoliberal transformation, in which everything became object to 
interests of transnational financiers. The driving force behind the Neoliberal 
restructuring can then be understood as a dominant class of transnational financiers 
and managers. ‘While this desperate group of individuals embedded in the corporate, 
trading, and developer worlds do not necessarily conspire as a class, and whole there 
might be frequent tensions between them, they nevertheless possess a certain 
accordance of interests that generally recognized the advantages (and now some of the 
dangers) to be derived from neoliberalization’ (ibid. 36). 
 In order to understand Neoliberalism and its effect on unemployment in Europe, 
a theoretical framework has to developed, which not only grasps the driving interests of 
the dominant class in Neoliberalism, pushing their projects forward, but also an 
economic understanding for unemployment within these transformed structures of 
accumulation has to be developed. As a point of departure to puzzle an appropriate 
theory, the concept of ‘historical structures’ can be applied. ‘A historical structure is a 
picture of a particular configuration of forces. [...] This configuration does not determine 
actions in any direct, mechanical way, but imposes pressures and constraints. 
Individuals and groups may move with pressures or resist and oppose them, but they 
cannot ignore them’ (Cox, 1981; 135). Together with a Keynesian macroeconomic 
understanding, the broader picture of Neoliberalism and unemployment can be drawn. 
The complementarity of both lies in the circumstance that Keynes’s theoretical 
reflections on unemployment go beyond the understandings of the specific, shortly 
discussed assumptions of neoclassical school, which lastly determine the theoretical 
horizon of Neoliberalism. Thus implementing Keynesian reflections into a historical 
materialism inspired by Cox suits to answer the research question best, as it captures 
social forces forming Neoliberalism in Europe, giving the frame for certain economic 
policies, as well as the structural determinants for unemployment coming with it. 
To start with the discussion of the concept of historical structures, what has to be 
grasped first, is that Cox theoretical project was an explicit critical one. He refers back to 
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critical philosophy and the transcendence of status quo. ‘Theory is always for someone 
and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspective derives from a 
position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is 
seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or social class, of dominance or 
subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, 
of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future […] There is […] no such 
thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space. When any theory 
so presents itself, it is more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its 
concealed perspective.’ (Cox 1981, 128) Following Cox’ argumentation, theory can in 
general be split up serving two distinct purposes. The first one aims to solve problems 
‘in order to smooth the functioning of the whole’ (Cox 1981, 129). Problem solving 
theory’s strength is to identify interrelated variables of a problem in existing knowledge. 
But, following Cox, this strength lies upon a false premise. Only because ceteris paribus is 
assumed, problem-solving theory is capable to work so precise as it does. But by doing 
so, a bias towards preexisting orders has to be accepted. Therefore, Cox argues for a 
second type of theory, identified as critical theory. ‘Because it deals with changing 
reality, critical theory must continually adjust its concepts to the changing object it seeks 
to understand and explain’ (Cox 1981, 129). For him, the task for critical political 
economy is to grasp the ‘historical mode of thought’ and relate it to it’s origins and 
transcendence, capable to understand actors and structures found in a particular period 
of history. In order to formulate a critical theory of Neoliberalism in Europe, a concept 
has to be formulated, which not only helps to understand the outcomes of crisis. 
Moreover, it should help to realize and understand possible rising alternative orders. 
How can such a critical theory be formulated? 
 According to Cox, the answer is to be found in historical materialism. His idea is 
distinct to that of the classical Marxist literature. Converse to the economic determinism, 
as for example detectable in Marx’ and Engels’ communist manifest, there is no one-way 
determinism of material ‘mechanisms’ in his theoretical work. But neither do ideas 
solely define capitalist society, as Weber (2010) juxtaposed his work to Marx. For Cox, 
neither ideas nor a specific material basis of society do solely define a collective path 
taken. Cox concept of historical structures rejects the idea that either material or 
ideology solely defines society. Rather, it is anxious to capture the interplay of both. In 
order to do so, Cox presented a concept lent from Gramsci, the so-called ‘historical 
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blocs’. In which the dialectical movement of ideas, institutions and material capabilities 
give rise to a historic specific cultural hegemony (Cox 1983). 
 Within hegemony, so the idea, power of a ruling class is exercised less by 
coercion (including propaganda and manipulation), but by the intellectual and moral 
capacity to achieve consensus among people. A capacity, which is held by the so-called 
dominant class. In his theoretical reflections, the concept of a dominant class came to 
play a central role. A dominant class’ interest is the driving force of a specific historic 
bloc. Already Gramsci claimed, though, that the interests of some could not be realized 
without a broader coalition. Therefore, hegemony is to be understood as a 
superimposition of an ideology, sought to construct a whole lived reality that would 
allow the existing socio-economic structures to be taken for granted. Taken to the 
international level, hegemony is not merely an order among states. Rather, it is an order 
within a world economy with a specific dominant mode of production, penetrating into 
any country, and linking other subordinate modes of production. This definition of 
hegemony thus fits with what has been said about the neoliberal class by David Harvey 
before. Neoliberal hegemony installs a complex of international social relationships, 
which connect the social classes of the different countries. For Cox, the dominant social 
class of an historical bloc assures its rule through the propagation and enforcement of a 
common culture and way of production, overcoming thereby any national borders. A 
historic bloc comes into rule by representing the interest of a dominant class through 
ideologies and institutions, which then define material capabilities, and reverse. 
 
 
 
Ideas 
Institutions 
Material 
capabilities 
Figure 3, The Triad of Social Forces after Cox, source: own 
development, based on: Cox 1981, 136. 
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The intertwined three ‘social forces’ of material capabilities, ideas and institutions are to 
be examined in order to develop an understanding of historical blocs, or, as Cox names 
them in another occasion, ‘limited totalities’ (Cox 1981). Material capabilities refer to 
society’s technological and organizational capabilities, accumulated material, and 
knowledge. This force also drives the accumulation of natural resources, and technology 
needed to transform natural resources into another material. Thus, the destructive 
power of material capabilities in a society plays also its role. This explicitly includes 
military destructive capabilities. Furthermore, stocks of equipment and wealth define 
material capabilities of a society in a specific historical bloc.  
Ideas form another social force. Here, Fox argues for two kinds of ideas. The first, 
more basic type, describes shared notions of nature and social relations. They tend to 
perpetuate habits and expectations of behavior and are called intersubjective meanings. 
On behalf of these intersubjective meanings people build images of social order held by 
certain social groups. These more elaborated ideas are called collective understandings. 
If the latter kind of ideas is somehow able to benefit the dominant class, it is propagated 
actively by it. For spreading and elaborating such collective understandings, intellectuals 
play a central role. ‘They perform the function of developing and sustaining the mental 
images, technologies and organizations which bind together the members of a class and 
of an historic bloc into a common identity’ (Cox 1983, 57). 
Institutions form the third social force. They are defined as amalgams of ideas 
and material power, which stabilize and perpetuate a particular order. To grasp a 
historical bloc, the interplay between the three forces has to be understood. ‘No one-way 
determinism need be assumed among these three; the relationships can be assumed to 
be reciprocal. The question of which way the lanes of force run is always an historical 
question to be answered by a study of the particular case’ (Cox 1981, 136).  
For the here presented project work, the above outlined abstract concepts of 
social forces will be rendered into concrete and to the research question related forms. 
Since the research question is specifically asking for the role of Neoliberalism, and the 
space here available is as restricted as much as the resources for this project work are, 
this work limits itself to discuss conflicting ‘collective understandings’ within capitalist 
society. In these times of crisis, though, the rise of challenging ideas, questioning the 
very basic ‘intersubjective meanings’ of exchange driven society, might come to play an 
more important role than ‘conflicts of understandings’ within capitalistic logic. But by 
elaborating on contradictions at work within capitalist system, a better understanding of 
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what exactly is the case can be achieved. And, as the pioneer of critical philosophy 
Horkheimer (1977) stated, critical theory aims to understand the object of critic in order 
to change it.   
 
Employment as material capability 
 
The limited frame of this project work does not allow to discuss the force of material 
capabilities to the extend Cox had in mind. His idea was not only to capture modes of 
production, but also the destructive force of material capabilities in a historical bloc. The 
latter is of crucial interest for questioning the capitalistic need of material growth on 
behalf of finite natural resources (Harvey 2009, Jackson 2010). In the following, for the 
sake of the formulated research question, the theoretical discussion and analysis of 
material capabilities will focus on the potential of Keynesian policies to create 
employment, and how this capability is blocked by neoclassical assumption on 
economics. The clear-cut between Keynesian and Neoclassical economics might be 
found confusing, since both actually can serve interests of Neoliberal forces, but by the 
end of this theoretical discussion it should be more apparent in how far already the 
inner-systemic though of Keynesian macroeconomics stands in opposition to the 
neoclassical school.  
Keynesian arguments can be understood in several ways, and no clear 
unequivocal reading of his General Theory (1949) can be claimed. Thus the following 
represents one way of interpreting it, maybe even in a rather uncommon way. To start 
with a most controversial point, Keynesian understanding of money will be discussed in. 
This first point is of interest in regard to employment, and is opposing neoclassical 
assumptions, because it states that today’s capitalism provides infinitive investment 
resources. Converse to Neoclassicists, as well to Marxists, investments are not 
exclusively dependent on former savings: ‘increased investment will always be 
accompanied by increased saving, but it can never be preceded by it. Dishoarding and 
credit expansion provides not an alternative to increased saving, but a necessary 
preparation for it. It is the parent, not the twin, of increased saving’ (Keynes 1973, 233). 
In today’s banking system, money for investment can be reproduced without any costs. 
As long as banks give out credits to potential creditors – creditors who use the lent 
money for investments in production - money will be returned to the banks in order to 
do the transaction needed for investments into machinery and the expenses to hire 
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work. Finally, any wage income, regardless if it is generated in the production of 
investment goods or consumption goods, is consumed by using credit cards and, or 
arranging transactions from one banking account to another. If not, over sudden, a 
significant part of the households in a national economy decides to burry money 
treasures in their yard, any money given out turns back to where it comes from, namely 
the banks. Thus, modern capitalist society provides an inexhaustible generator for 
money (Elsenhans 2010; Davidson 2009). The decisive point is if investments produce 
an income, and therefore establish an effective demand, or not. Not the scarcity of 
money for investments is then determinant for growth and inflation, but the demand for 
credits to invest in production. 
Demand for credit is In Keynesian terms dependent on expectations of returns. 
These expectations are sometimes quite subjective, and never free of uncertainty. 
Keynesians therefore reject the neoclassical “ergodic” axiom (Davidson 2012), which 
states that statistical evaluations of the past give insight into a rational forecast of 
economic development. Thus, investments in production are dependent on the actual 
environment and the subjective measurement of the possibility to gain more returns by 
investing in production than hording money in funds. Elsenhans, therefore, points to the 
possibility of inflationary processes within the finance markets by an increasing value of 
assets (Elsenhans 2000; 2010). Problematically, when expansionary money policies 
meet ever rising returns of shareholder values, investments in production might not be 
realized. This is why Keynes blames in Chapter 17 of his ‘General Theory’ (1949) money 
to block full employment, in a problem called liquidity preference. As long as the ‘root’ of 
what Davidson calls ‘time machines’ (e.g. hording money in assets, shareholder value) 
appears to give higher returns than investments in production, unemployment can 
prevail even within neoclassical understandings of equilibrium (Wray 2010). 
Unsurprisingly, then, Keynes formulates a different understanding of equilibrium in the 
General Theory. For Keynes, economy is in equilibrium at the point at which effective 
demand equals income. A point, which will not necessarily be reached within a straight 
laisser-faire policy. ‘It (the General Theory) contains a framework that explains 
structural failure in a laissez-faire monetary economy’ (Rogers 2010, 137).  Crucially, a 
capitalist society with a modern banking sector is always capable to provide the needed 
money for further investments, but may lack consumption in so called under-
consumption crises.  
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The ever-revolving threat of under-consumption is theoretically deducible of 
Keynes’s General theory, too. The whole ambition of naming his book General Theory is 
only accountable, if Keynes’s claim that neoclassical models are only special cases is 
understood. In the General Theory neoclassical understandings of equilibrium can be 
achieved at several levels, and no particular reason assures that unregulated markets 
will achieve the one equilibrium of full employment per se. One reason for that is the 
before mentioned non-neutral role of money. Dependent on the rate of interests, the 
actual capability for generating returns in production investment can be lower than the 
rate in money hoarding. Moreover, ‘contra Say’s Law, increasing aggregate supply 
beyond the point of effective demand will produce losses as it drives demand prices 
below long-period supply prices. Attempts by firms to increase output beyond the point 
of effective demand will not create it’s own profitable aggregate demand as suggested by 
Say’s Law’ (ibid. 140). This point is of particular interest for these times of re-globalized 
production (Ravenhill 2011; Kaplinsky 2007; Schwartz 2010). Where transnational 
value chains domain production, regeneration of sufficient demand in a national 
economy can be challenged. Production can thus meet insufficient demand and depress 
further expectations regardless of fully implemented wage flexibility. This is the same to 
say that investments, hence employment and consumption, can be depressed, despite 
having fulfilled all neoclassical needs for equilibrium.   
A second point in Keynesian understandings play a role for unemployment in 
global political economy. In neoclassical terms, free-floating exchange rates are to assure 
optimal distribution of investments. On the other hand, if, like in the EU, exchange rates 
are fixed, a crucial regulation for surpluses and deficits in balance of payments is lacking. 
Keynes, after the Second World War, fought his fight in Bretton Woods to assure a 
sustainable environment for international trade. Referring to the dangers of mass 
unemployment experienced in the aftermath of crisis in the 20th of last century, he 
argued for the necessity to manage globalization in order to avoid mass unemployment. 
One central issue he wanted to realize was an international organization that balances 
deficits and surpluses of trades in between national economies. Therefore, the IMF was 
supposed to act as a global bank, in which surplus countries pay the amount of money 
won out of exports. This money was then lent to deficit countries in order to implement 
growth strategies and to maintain low unemployment rates. (Schwartz 2010, 192-197). 
The logic behind this thought is quite simple. In a global political economy it is not 
possible for every country to have trade surpluses. Employment on behalf of export-led 
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growth strategies in some countries, then, lead unavoidably to deficits in the balance of 
payments of other countries. These deficits can then set the frame for unemployment in 
countries with negative trade balance, hence Keynes’s proposal to manage exchange 
rates in order to assure that domestic growth strategies do not provoke unemployment 
abroad. Without such a management of exchange rates, so-called mercantilist strategies 
are likely to occur, provoking unemployment in trade the partner’s domestic economies.  
From all what just has been said about Keynesian understanding of economics, it 
is apparent that there is nothing to fear about running government deficits, as long as 
there are investments in production that generate incomes. Junctures are even likely to 
appear, in which a government is the only spender that can increase market demand for 
industrial products, and thereby maintain a profitable entrepreneurial system. The 
opposite of that fear holds true. For government to spend less in the hope of keeping 
down the size of the national debt would mean causing market demand to remain slack 
and thereby impoverishing both business firms and workers. This situation can be 
enforced by the lack of exchange rates management. Consequently, in order to drag an 
economy out of a serious recession, governments should undertake significant 
additional spending and macroeconomic management to incur deficits that can be in 
whole, or party, financed by selling bonds to the central bank. In essence, this means 
that public spending can be financed by “printing money”. Way to often, this is directly 
connected towards the threat of inflation. But, as Davidson points out, ‘printing money’ 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for inflation. The whole idea of a direct 
connection between deficit spending financed by printing money and inflation is a 
logical deduction that follows from the neutral money axiom. An axiom that is rejected 
by Keynesian macroeconomics, including its implication that any increases in the 
quantity of money supplied will have absolutely no effect on the amount of goods and 
services produced or on the level of employment (Davidson 2009). From both the 
always-available money for investments and the sometimes-necessary anti-cyclical 
government spending it is apparent that there is no need for austerity politics in times of 
crisis, but the contrary.  
Within this brief discussion of Keynesian economics, it should have got clear that 
there is a high dependency of employment on institutional interventions into economy. 
When no institution is willing to realize policies to generate the Keynesian 
understanding of equilibrium, unemployment is likely to occur. Especially central banks, 
with their capability of ‘printing money’, play a central role towards unemployment. 
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With an inexhaustible resource for investments at hand, the question is rather to have 
an institution to invest in favor of employment and sustainability in times of under-
consumption than a realization of austerity politics. Thus austerity policies in times of 
economic downturns are found not to be deducible of material capabilities alone. 
Following these theoretical insights, a necessity for austerity policies in times of crisis 
has to be seen as an ideological construct. A construct which, as just discussed below, is 
strongly intertwined with neoclassical assumptions on economics and neoliberal 
interests.  
 
Ideas and economic government 
 
 As stated before, Cox distinguishes between two kinds of ideas. First, he refers to 
intersubjective meanings, representing more general concepts. Concepts understood as 
‘intersubjective meanings’ can be for example ideas such as ‘state’, ‘progress’ or 
‘capitalism’. Despite of being commonly accepted as ‘reality’, already those concepts can 
be either rejected or adapted by individuals. More challenged ideas, though, are what 
Cox calls collective understandings. As a second form of ideas, they are competing 
collective images of social order, which finally relate to material conditions of groups. 
Within this second kind of ideas, we can find a struggle between the Neoclassical and the 
Keynesian school, proposing converse policies for unemployment in capitalist 
economies. 
One central reason to distinguish two distinct approaches on economics, and a 
major dissent on how to model macroeconomics can be found in the methodological 
tools of both schools. Neoclassical understanding works with its particular methodology, 
the so-called general equilibrium model (Brümmerhof 1992). Debreu-Walrasian 
modeling can be stated to dominate economic lectures in universities and schoolbooks. 
Post-Keynesian methodology opposes such neoclassical takes on economics. Due to the 
conviction that uncertainty in economics cannot be disband, Keynesian inspired 
thinkers claim ‘critical realism’ as an appropriate epistemology for macroeconomic 
theory, doubting the fruitfulness of equilibrium models.  
 Following Jespersen’s argumentation on Post-Keynesian methodology (2009), 
the concept of uncertainty comes to play a decisive role in dividing the two biggest 
economic schools. Where in neoclassical terms uncertainty is equivalent to risk, and 
therefore object to a management taking decisions on the base of rationality (Porter 
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2010, 56 73), Keynesians reject the possibility to rationalize uncertainty. After Keynes, 
besides instability due to speculation, there is a general instability in economics due to 
human nature. ‘There is the instability due to the characteristic of human nature that a 
large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than 
on a mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic.’ This is why 
Keynes argues for “animal spirits”, letting economic decisions appear as ’a spontaneous 
urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of 
quantitative probabilities. (Keynes 1949, 161). 
Thus, rather than evaluating and distributing risk, Keynesians inspired 
economical though accepts the impossibility of providing an epistemology that suggests 
an a priori trend towards equilibrium in market society, and hence neglects policies that 
render risk into manageable variables. Not because the mathematical models to capture 
risk in economic transactions are not yet elaborated enough, but because the statistical 
certainty won out of past events cannot simply be projected into the future, is why 
uncertainly remains unmanageable. ‘Macroeconomic development is determined by the 
sum of millions of these decisions with only partially knowable consequences. Hence, 
individual uncertainty is transmitted into macroeconomic uncertainty, which 
epistemologically implies, among other things, that a relevant long-term equilibrium 
model cannot be formulated’ (Jespersen 2009, 36). 
 This stands clearly converse to Neoclassicism, which works with a micro 
foundation of macroeconomic theory, where it is essential to set the axiom of rational 
behavior. Kaletsky, reflecting on the dominant way of economic thought before crisis, 
states that ‘to be scientifically valid, all economic models had to comply with a rational 
expectation hypothesis (REH): The model had to assume that all economic behavior, 
including all expectations about the future, were consistent with the economist’s own 
theories about hoe the world worked’ (2011, 169). Consequently, this neoclassical 
theoretical assumption needs also rational behavior by governments, hence demands 
policies that ‘discipline’ governments to act ‘rational’. The claim not to buy public bonds, 
for example, is due to the idea, sampling the very collective understanding of 
neoclassical scholars, that governments could leave ‘rationalization’ through ‘market 
discipline’ by ‘printing money’.  
The regime of government deduced of a neoclassical understanding asks for a 
behavior in public spending according to the rules expected likewise from any other 
market participant: rationality. This to say that governments should never spend more 
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than collected taxes, and taxes again are said to miss out in private consumption. Since 
markets are said to generate a much more sensible orientation of production and 
distribution towards the different subjective needs in society, states should not ‘force’ 
political decided spending. Therefore, despite avoiding public spending deficits, 
governments should reduce taxes to a minimum, implicating that social systems are to 
be reduced to a minimum. Conversely, the presented Keynesian understanding of 
macroeconomics states that markets are driven by uncertainty, which can rule out 
rational expectations at any time. Thus, governments ready to bail out and ensure 
effective demand have to be maintained, and there is no ‘moral hazard’ in buying state 
bonds, as any actor in markets can be found to behave ‘irrational’ at any time. 
Keynesians argue that there is an always-possible market failure, and therefore a need 
for a macroeconomic manager. Narrowing both schools down to the here central 
question, opposition in theoretical standpoints of view also hold in regard to 
unemployment. Where Neoclassical ideas argue that ‘unemployment demands flexibility 
of wages and mobility by the workers themselves’ (Hayek 2011, 425), Keynesians, as 
already discussed above, see that full employment cannot be taken for granted even by 
doing so in a perfect manner, hence intervention by governments have to be realized.    
So both schools argue for different roles for governments in regard do economics 
due to diverging theoretical takes on macroeconomics. Here, as Dean (2012) argues, it is 
crucial ‘to distinguish between the state and what might be called the regimes of 
government of and by the state’ (Dean 2012, 6). With distinguishing between state and 
regime of government, a rather misleading understanding of the ‘state’, as being subject 
of permanent fundamental transformations every generation or two, can be avoided. For 
example, the ‘new’, neoliberal form of state has not simply replaced an ‘old’, Keynesian 
welfare state. Rather has the general concept, and the particular institutional form of 
state developed over a period of centuries. Adapting to a shift of economic 
understandings, the state did not abandon its role as such over sudden. Throughout its 
genealogy, the concept of state has linked conceptions of public office, legitimacies over 
monopoly of violence, ideas on ultimate civil territorial authority, law-governed and 
law-organized state form, and the maintenance of civil peace and security into an 
articulated set of material practices. Within the history of the state, both kinds of ideas 
used by Cox (1981) can be found:  ideas as intersubjective meanings, like the state by 
itself; and ideas as collective images of social order, held by different groups of people, 
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competing for dominance. The latter is to analyze towards its role in defining economic 
patterns, which could cause unemployment.  
This project work agrees with Cox, for whom the ideological reproduction of 
society goes hand in hand with material production, and stresses one crucial pint for the 
following analysis: It makes a difference whether a regime government is behaving 
within a Keynesian understanding of economics or a neoclassical one. The analysis of 
macroeconomic performance should then take ideological reflections into consideration. 
Particularly in regard to finance, a certain theoretical take on a government’s role in 
finance can predetermine material capabilities. ‘Its [finance] influence over production 
lies in its ability to politically influence states to follow macroeconomic policies that 
have an effect on what is produced and for which market’ (Leysens 2008, 55). In short, 
ideologies form part of economic performance as they are dialectically reinforcing 
material capabilities. But it is the neoclassical approach, which claims the need for a 
regime of government holding back macroeconomic intervention, even in times of 
unemployment and possible crisis of under-consumption. 
 
Institution 
  
If an idea has come to be ‘the shared perception people have of institutions or practices’ 
(Leysens 2008, 48p), cultural hegemony can be established. Crucially, the pure presence 
of an ideology does not automatically mean to achieve cultural hegemony. Institutions 
can work on the ground of hegemonic understandings, but they also can enforce ideas 
by coercion. While the first mode of institutional rule refers to legitimacy of certain 
ideas, the second reveals the absence of a broader consensus for ideas set by 
institutions. Either ways, ideas and institutions in rule are to serve the interest of the 
dominant class. Stephen Gill agrees with David Harvey thoughts on Neoliberalism, and 
states that European Neoliberalism can be described as a ‘political and legal 
reconstruction of capital through the agency of a neoliberal transnational historic bloc 
and a process of elite international policy formation’ (1998, 11)  
This process, in which a social class is reaching for hegemony, has, according to 
Cox, its staring point in the sphere of national politics (1981; 1983). From there on a 
‘World Order’ can be shaped in favor of this national dominant class. ‘Once social 
hegemony has been consolidated domestically it may expand beyond this social order to 
move outward on world scale’ (Bieler & Morton 2001, 21). International organizations 
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are then to be understood as institutions serving the interests of a transnational active 
class, rooting in national consolidated hegemonies. ‘These institutions and their rules 
are created/shaped by the state (in alliance with other states), for whose benefit the 
hegemonic order exists. As such, they mirror perspectives that favor the dominant state 
and economic classes’ (Leysens 2008, 49). Thus institutionalization on European level is 
to be traced back to national interest of a dominant class and their reach to rule on a 
transnational level. 
Ideas get institutionalized, and institutions, again, shape material capabilities and 
ideas in a specific historical bloc. For the reasons given from the Keynesian theory so far, 
this project work focuses on the institutionalization of ideas related to finance within 
the EMU. Regimes of government in the EMU change by either following Keynesian 
macroeconomic policies or stick to neoclassical understandings of appropriate economic 
behavior. By adapting to the latter, one can meaningful talk about a neoliberal 
transformation of neoliberal public order, which is an internationalized regime of 
government. ‘The internationalization of the state gives precedence to certain state 
agencies – notably ministers of finance and prime ministers’ office - which are key 
points of adjustments of domestic to international economic policy. Ministries of 
industries, labor ministries, planning offices, which had been built up in the context of 
national corporatism, tended to be subordinated to the central organs of 
internationalized public policy” (Cox 1981, 146). Today central political decisions in 
Neoliberalism are taken in the international sphere, justifying the here taken European 
point of view.  
 Building on the pioneer work of Cox, Gill introduces the concept of ‘New 
Constitutionalism’ to analyze social forces in the making of Europe: ‘It seeks to separate 
economic policies from broad political accountability in order to make governments 
more responsive to the discipline of market forces and correspondingly less responsive 
to popular-democratic forces and process’ (Gill 1998, 5). The rationality of neoclassical 
economic policy advises abstracts economic government into a transnational sphere, 
where institutions reflect the interest of a transnational capitalist and managerial class. 
These interests are most apparent in the solely orientation of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) towards so called ‘price stability’, which, in the reasoning of the ECB, ‘contributes 
to high levels of economic growth and employment - mainly as a result of improvements 
in the transparency of the price mechanism, the more efficient allocation of resources, 
reductions in inflation risk premia and interest rates (which reduce real interest rates 
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and increase incentives to invest), reduction of distortion caused by inflation or 
deflation and last but not least as a result of the creation of conditions essential for the 
formation of rational expectations (Lacina & Kapounek 2009, 23). The theoretical 
foundation of this ideology is, again, neoclassicism. 
 Taking New Constitutionalism as analytical concept, two points are crucial to 
claim. First, ideology is penetrated by the material production of value. Thence the 
institutions representing hegemonic thought are to be understood as shaped by material 
value and ideas of powers, too. Moreover, as institutions are dependent on resources 
and funding, the force of material capabilities very directly influents their specific forms. 
In short, the dialectical triangle between material capabilities, institutions, and ideas has 
to be aware of its vulnerability of ‘fetishistic’ value (Horkheimer & Adorno 2008) and 
dominance in general. This is also to say that social researchers are required to keep on 
severe self-reflection (see also Kincheloe & McLaren 2000). The latter concern is also 
expressed by Cox well cited statement: ‘Theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose’ (Cox 1981, 128). To put it Marxist terms, since society as ‘a whole’ is driven by 
the fetish of exchange value, the production of ideology in it also is. This especially holds 
true for economic theory. Analyzing the role of academics, providing the theoretical 
grounds for the neoliberal turn since the 1970s’ (Kaletsky 2011, Dean 2012), the 
actuality of this critical claim cannot be underestimated. Dialectic thinking does not 
share the optimism of Popper and Bhaskar towards the research community as a self-
fixing institution. In short, Ideas, dominating as much as critical ones, have to be 
reflected critically by social research.  
 Secondly, and also following of what just has been said, the importance of 
institutions for the here provided research becomes even more obvious when some 
attention is drawn to the actual possibility of fallacy. Gramsci stressed this point to 
criticize what he called orthodox Marxism. By reducing social dynamics towards a solely 
mechanical working of the basis, and to somewhat automatic reactions of the dependent 
subjects in the super-structure, orthodox Marxists miss out the crucial role mistaking 
actions can play in historical structure. 
 
Mechanical materialism does not even consider the possibility of mistakes, but 
sees any political act as directly enforced by the basis, and this is to say that 
they are seen as reflections of real and eternal (acquired) changes in the basis. 
The concept of mistakes is complex: It can rely on an individual impulse or can 
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express the intention of certain groups and sections to achieve the dominance 
within a ruling grouping. Intents that can, crucially, fail. (Gramsci 1980, 219p.)1 
 
Thus, the importance of hegemonic ideology represented in institutions in the dialectical 
triangle becomes apparent. Because ideas and institutions are not simply an always true 
reflection of a real basis, but can be mistaken, dominant ideas represented in institutions 
have to be considered as having a very own moment defining a historical structure. 
Ideas that have to be enforced by power because they are lacking ‘legitimacy’ might not 
only be opposed to the interest of the majority, but they also can be mistaken by 
assumptions on material capabilities that do not hold at a closer look. 
 The institutions of interest, then, can be defined as followed. They are superior to 
the member states of the EMU in the sense that they define monetary and fiscal 
frameworks in which these states can act. As full-employment is dependent on a 
hegemonic ideology that counteracts under-consumption threats, those institutions 
being capable to do so are of central interest. Thus, the superior institutions of the EMU 
are to be questioned for collective understandings they reflect, and how the dominant 
class is profiting of these. These ideas, though, have also to be questioned towards 
dominance and its vulnerability to be influenced by exchange value. Moreover, ideas 
reflected in institutions can simply be mistaken. 
 Now all three forces forming the historical structure of Neoliberalism on which 
employment is dependent have been discussed. Besides the Keynesian understanding of 
the material capability in a society with modern banking sector to invest at any time into 
employment programs, it has also be revealed that theoretical assumptions of 
neoclassical thought block these interventions. Reasons for institutions not to intervene 
might come with their reliance on neoclassical theoretical assumptions, which prioritize 
the needed for rational expectations. Theoretical assumptions to do so can be mistaken, 
but they also can be hold due to political interests of a dominant class of financiers. 
Regardless if intentional or not, rendering institutions of the EMU in neoclassical 
monetary understandings effect unemployment rates in Europe, as the following 
analysis will try to demonstrate.  
                                                        
1 Translated by the author: Der mechanische Materialismus zieht die Möglichkeit des Irrtums überhaupt 
nicht in Betracht, sondern sieht jeden politischen Akt unmittelbar durch die Basis bestimmt das heißt als 
eine Widerspiegelung einer realen und dauerhaften (erworbenen) Veränderung der Basis. Das Prinzip des 
„Irrtums“ ist komplex: Er kann auf einem individuellen Impuls auf Grund falscher Einschätzung beruhen 
oder auch Ausdruck eines Versuchs bestimmter Gruppen und Grüppchen sein, die Vorherrschaft 
innerhalb der herrschenden Gruppierungen an sich zu reißen; Versuche, die scheitern können.    
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Methodology 
 
The following analysis will be divided into two parts. The first part of analysis addresses 
the rise of Neoliberalism in Europe, and briefly presents and discusses central aspects to 
understand neoliberal determinants for employment rates. Afterwards, the outbreak of 
financial crisis and its effects on employment will be outlined. The historical 
contextualization of recent effects of crisis on employment is necessary, because 
neoliberal crisis is to be understood as a process, developing historically. For this 
reason, the neoliberal project has to be observed in its development throughout time. 
Therefore, the following analysis starts with an historical view on institutions and 
neoliberal rule in the EMU.  
For Europe, neoliberal policies on European level started with the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992 (formally called the Treaty of the European Union), and the Euro 
Convergence Criteria taken in the agreement. This treaty marks the historical starting 
point of this project work. Since the Maastricht Treaty, neoliberal ideas were installed in 
Europe, and institutions such the ECB have been created. In its first decades, when the 
economy was growing and unemployment was a minor problem in Europe, emerging 
neoliberal historical structure seemed legitimated, and thus could develop. After many 
following treaties among European’s states, institutions and agreements built a common 
frame for Europe, affecting the political economy (inter alia) of member states, and 
justifying the here taken focus on the European level. With the rise of neoliberal Europe, 
identifiable with the EMU, the single currency (the Euro), and the ECB, EMU member 
states have less autonomy to realize independent fiscal policies, and are finally fiscally 
determined by supranational institutions. Power of nation states clearly remains 
important, but in regard to economic decisions, nowadays most policies are formulated 
on a European, transnational level. 
  In order to realize such a complex analysis as to explore the relation between the 
two variables Neoliberalism and unemployment in Europe, a Coxian methodology will 
be applied. This kind of approximation, based in Robert W. Cox studies of the 
international relations sphere, divides the study object in three categories: material 
capabilities, ideas and institutions. This “triad” allows the analysis to capture the 
relationship between the material conditions and the ideas (the “structure” and the 
“superstructure” in Marxian words), avoiding any determinism by one or the other. 
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Furthermore, with this broad vision, the project avoids the limitations of what Cox called 
problem-solving theory, standing closer to critical theory as explained above. 
To analyze the social force of institutions, it is of central interest to see how they 
were produced by neoliberal policies. Furthermore, their particular role and effect on 
unemployment rates is to be questioned when no institutionalized macroeconomic 
stimulus exists in times of under-consumption. To do so, institutions as the European 
Commission and especially the ECB will be studied. Because of their central role in 
regard to its price stability objective, one of the pillars of European political economy of 
last decades, these institutions are to be questioned for their political force to realize 
policies such as price stability. 
 Ideas will be observed through two different ways. First, treaties as Maastricht 
further agreements on monetary integration will demonstrate how the neoliberal 
historical structure was settled in the European Union. Press notes will be used for the 
purpose of showing the discourse of the dominant class, identifying it in the high 
position European institutions officials’ declarations.  
In regard to material capabilities, this project work takes a skeptical position 
towards classical models to analyze economic performances. This is, because, according 
to Jespersen, ‘there is nothing less than a methodological abyss that decides the 
neoclassical macro-theory from Keynes’s own contribution and its subsequent 
theoretical and methodological developments, called the post-Keynesian macro-theory’ 
(2011, 15). This abyss is due to the role uncertainty plays in Keynesian inspired macro 
economy, as mentioned just before in the theoretical chapter. In short, neither rational 
markets with their general tendency towards equilibrium, nor the idea of solely rational 
agents participating in markets are acceptable assumptions to work with from a Post-
Keynesian perspective. Thus, the here used methodology to evaluate such a measure of 
macroeconomic performance, as unemployment lastly is, rejects to work within the 
frame of Walrasian IS-LM models.  
Rather, a critical realist perspective will be taken. Here, as the philosopher 
Popper stressed, possible falsification for hypothesis are central. General equilibrium 
models are then not rejected as such, but seen as problematic for reasons of under-
consumption in times of re-globalized economy, because within the Keynesian 
theoretical frame, demand can be insufficient to allow markets to come into equilibrium. 
Instead of assuming that markets will do so in any way, this project works aims to check 
the hypothesis that equilibrium under Neoliberal Europe will not be achieved. A 
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historical perspective elaborating on the developments on the demand side under 
Neoliberalism aims to discuss one of those axioms of neoclassical economy, of which 
Jespersen writes that it forms ‘part of an axiomatic basis that is rarely subject to an 
empirical test (Jespersen 2011, 7). Demand is seen as a central variable of interest to 
explain performance of the material capability of Neoliberal Europe to create 
employment:  ‘for Keynesians […] it is demand and not supply that determines the level 
of economic activity’ (Elsenhans 2008, 356). Hence the analysis will develop an 
historical materialism out of an demand side perspective.  
At the end of the first decade of 21st century, the financial bubble burst affected 
global economy and created a recession of range not seen since the Great Depression in 
1929, letting unemployment grow dramatically. At this point, the second part of the 
analysis begins, highlighting the effects of the crisis in the unemployment and how the 
neoliberal ideology responded to it.  In the second part, the analysis will try to grasp the 
different action undertaken by European institutions, especially such taken by the 
European Commission as well as the ECB, because of its central role in economic and 
financial affairs. By mirroring realized policies in crisis management, the struggle for 
neoliberal ideas becomes apparent. Particular attention is paid to the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and following newly installed institutions to manage 
crisis. Especially because if the contra dictionary moment this institution could seem to 
have with the neoliberal world vision. But, as the analysis will show, the EFSF aid to the 
countries is conditioned to the adoption of “cutting measures” and the aim of reduce the 
public spending, as will be exemplified by the case of Portugal.  
In regard to material capabilities after crisis, the second part of analysis will 
explore the interdependence between neoliberal policies after crisis and unemployment. 
For the sake of transparency in the argumentation, and to create a founded thesis on 
effects and causes in between Neoliberalism and unemployment, different advantages of 
qualitative comparative methodologies will be applied. First, a ‘quick test of conjecture’ 
(Berg-Schlosser et al. 16) will check the theoretical understanding of unemployment 
formulated so far, as being mainly dependent on demand side. Then, to avoid a 
subjective bias, comparison between cases of most similarity and most difference can 
help to explore the diversity of possible explanations for unemployment. Goal for this 
kind of Qualitative Comparative Analysis is not to achieve an unequivocal one true story 
to tell about unemployment, but to show one possible explanatory thesis. 
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To trace the process at work causing unemployment in Europe, the so far 
discussed ‘black box’ of European unemployment rates can be then sliced up into 
smaller units, namely into national economies, since two crucial conditions to apply the 
comparative method are given. Firstly, the cases for comparison do share a common 
regional and historical frame of interest, namely the integration into the monetary 
unions as neoliberal project. Secondly, the cases are captured by the theory with which 
this project work is equipped. All cases are highly intertwined in the new-
Constituionalizm of European monetary integration, but they are also still states, 
understood as the presented more general concept of ideas of ‘intersubjective 
meanings’. States have historically developed throughout centuries, and thus laws in 
labor markets may differ, and also difference in cultural and material capabilities can 
cause distraction when applying the comparative method. This is to say that it is not 
possible to control all variables, and no hard causality can be presented here. Rather is 
this part of analysis to be understood as forming critical theory, which is more anxious 
to draw a general picture than to indentify hard determining facts. 
 The minimal amount of cases to apply QCA methods is three. Now, in order to 
countercheck ad hoc findings within the cases, which might explain unemployment, two 
cases of similarity and one of difference can serve to test the variables. To put it more 
concrete: Portugal and Spain are both cases with rising unemployment rates and 
Germany is then a system of difference, since unemployment rates are decreasing in this 
case. As the theoretical frame of this project work already hints towards the centrality of 
demand as explanatory variable, differences and similarities in the three cases around 
demand development are of particular interest. Again, what will be achieved in the end 
is not a strong causal explanation, but a quickly checked conjecture and transparently 
formulated idea of what processes are at work in Europe, effecting unemployment rates 
after crisis.     
In order to give the brief outline of how demand developed under Neoliberalism, 
and to support further argumentation, data from different articles published in scientific 
journals will be used. Furthermore, data given by European institutions like Eurostat are 
used, and information gathered from newspapers. As this student project work has not 
the resources to undertake broad, quantitative inquiries, it is reliant on the validity of 
numbers and information used by the quoted sources. Having mentioned this caveat, 
validity of data nevertheless rests on the renomé of the scientific journals cited and the  
(non-) governmental organizations whose reports have been used. Data used of the 
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Euromemorandum group might be questioned towards this renomé on which this 
project work relies, but it can be claimed that it is not the aim of this project work to 
mirror developments in a numerous exact form, but to hint towards more general 
developments in a critical way. Finally, any misreading and incorrect use of data is solely 
product of the group work and not to the work cited.  
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Analysis  
 
(a) The European Union and the new world order in 1990s’ 
 
Global world order experienced change during the 70s’ and 80s’ of last century. States 
and production more and more overcame national borders. Conversely, post World War 
II era has been a time of ‘strong’ states and viewer economic transnational trade. Since 
Keynesian macroeconomic policies have been able to foster domestic growth with 
significant success, production and consumption remained affairs of inner-market 
policies. But finally this inverse focused economic strategy confronted severe problems, 
known as oil shock or stagflation. Slowly, new ideas on economics replaced elder ones. 
New institutions were established and production and trade, as an ongoing process 
throughout a long time, globalized. (Schwartz 2010, 177-322). It would be mistaken to 
say that this had been the advent of a completely new phenomenon. Global trade and 
transnationalization is observable already before the World Wars. Rather it is 
appropriate to say that globalization experienced a period of stagnation and 
containment after its first bigger expansion. (Bayly 2004, Elsenhans 2007).     
With the reemergence of globalization during the Reagan/Thatcher restructuring, 
the then established historical structure could be identified as the historical bloc of 
Neoliberalism. On the global level, Cox himself already argued for a rise of ‘hyper-
liberalism’, triggered by the apparent demise of U.S. hegemony and its pax-americana 
(Cox 1981). “In neo-Gramscian terms what is occurring is the political and legal 
reconstruction of capital through the agency of a neo-liberal transnational historical bloc 
and a process of elite international policy-formation. […] The transnational historical 
bloc is a political synthesis of interests and identities drawn from across social classes 
and nations that mediates and seeks to co-ordinate national, regional and global 
dimensions of accumulation and legitimation. It thus generates the ideas, institutions 
and material capabilities that are associated with the global shift towards more neo-
liberal forms of state” (Gill, 2001; 54).  
The ideological frame of Neoliberalism criticized the economic polices from 
which it evolved, and what in the western countries is often identified with the ‘Golden-
Age’ of the Keynesian welfare project after the Second World War (Hansen & Wigger 
2012, 59). The new historical bloc then manifested in the Washington Consensus and 
several multinational institutions like the World Trade Organization and World Bank. In 
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the end, Neoliberalism replaced states as economical planners, and gave rise to a global 
organization within markets. In this neoliberal historical bloc, the dominant class can be 
described as a class of transnational capitalists. To be clear, in Coxian terms the 
transnational class is not pushed across national borders by solely economic 
mechanisms. Scholars of Marx, like Lenin and Luxemburg, tended to argue for such a 
purely material process that pushed capitalists across borders in order to realize profits 
to counteract Marxens ‘law’ of the tendency demising profit rates. Besides the possible 
logical rejection of this argumentation (Okishio 1961), Cox argued for the importance of 
cultural means of a dominant class.  
As already stated in the theoretical part of this project report, the dominant class 
in Neoliberalism can be understood as a managerial class in transnational production 
and finanzialication. In Europe, following Apeldoorn (2001), this dominance has not 
been unchallenged. From the very beginning of renewed European integration, triggered 
by the challenges of prevailing stagflation in the 80s’ of last century, Apeldoorn 
identifies three different historic blocs competing for dominance in the renewed 
European project. The social democratic view on Europe’s need for transformation 
differed from those of neo-mercantilists and the neo-liberal ones. Finally, though, a class 
of transnational producers, organized in an organization called European round table of 
Industrialists (ERT), achieved through a here not discussable political synthesis of 
different forces an ‘embedded’ form of Neoliberalism. The compromise of diverging 
European forces laid in the not radically realized predominance of market force, but in 
the positive reliance on it. Crucially, Appeldoorn states that this consensus was ‘biased 
in favor of the neo-liberal project due to the neo-liberal orthodoxy underpinning the 
EMU’ (2001, 81).  
Accordingly, Bieler and Morton stressed that ‘the revival of the European 
integration in the mid-1980s and the emergence of a ‘New Europe’ have to be analyzed 
against the background of globalization and the transnational restructuring of social 
forces since the early 1970s’ (2001, 4). Also following Apeldoorn’s analysis they stress 
that ‘neo-liberalism was in large part a strategic project of globally oriented finance and 
industrial capital’ (Gill 2011, 53). Thus, restructuring economic frameworks through 
newly emerging monetary integration is identifiable with the rise of a neoliberal historic 
bloc in Europe. Ideological and institutional cornerstones of this process can be found 
with the Maastricht treaty agreements 1991, the ‘completion’ of the internal markets 
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1992, and the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates as well as transfer of monetary 
sovereignty to the ECB.  
The specific form of deliberately European Neoliberalism becomes particularly 
apparent by examining ECB policies. ‘The convergence of national interests around a 
neo-liberal, deregulatory program with the focus on low inflation was a precondition for 
the revival of the European integration in the mid-1980s’ (Bieler & Morton 2001, 15). 
The focus of the ECB on so-called price stability was an essential juncture for the 
European neoliberal project form the very first place. With the installation of the ECB in 
the form it is shaped today, former national interests of dominant classes had been 
translated into this particular transnational organization. Again, the recent frame does 
not allow a deeper discussion of dominant actors, but the hint towards the German 
Bundesbank as key actor in this process should not be withhold here.2 Copying German 
policies of previous decades,  ‘the ECB’s governing council has defined price stability as a 
year-on year increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the Euro 
area of below 2%. In the pursuit of price stability, the ECB aims at maintaining inflation 
rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.” According to the ECB, 
”[maintaining price stability] is the best contribution mone ary policy can make to 
economic growth and job creation“ (ECB 2012). The latter part of the quote exemplifies 
the neoclassical theoretical frame in which the neoliberal project of European monetary 
integration worked.  
The European Union is thus one example of how the historical bloc of 
Neoliberalism shaped regional institutions and ideologies. Especially the so-called 
Maastricht Treaty, introducing the ‘Euro Convergence Criteria’ (ECC), and new 
institutions, as the ECB give a clear examples for this transformation. As a historical 
project reflecting both, ideas and material capabilities, the treaties signed mapped the 
road to the final goal to trade with a common currency. Three stages of European 
economic and monetary integration were then supposed to be realized by those States, 
which aimed to form part of the common currency. ECC not only gave path to a common 
currency, it represented a decisive point for future and present of Europe’s economy and 
the creation of the EMU. In order to reach the third and final stage of integration into 
‘new Europe’, and therefore to adopt the Euro as domestic currency, all countries were 
supposed to achieve several commonly defined goals. These goals, giving norm to an 
                                                        
2 In another occasion, one aspect of interest for further analysis is the cultural root of 
what had become the main paradigm of the ECB, inflation reduction. 
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economic frame seen as appropriate economic behavior, can be found in the Article 121 
(1) of the treaty, and deal with four macroeconomic issues:  
 
1. Price stability: "The achievement of a high degree of price stability; this 
will be apparent from a rate of inflation which is close to that of, at 
most, the three best-performing Member States in terms of price 
stability." This point is related with the main function of the ECB, as 
explained below. 
 
2. Government finances. Here the treaty stipulates: "The sustainability of 
the government financial position […] will be apparent from having 
achieved a government budgetary position without a deficit that is 
excessive […]” This criteria makes reference to two issues: the annual 
government deficit (which must not exceed 3 % of the GDP) and 
government debt (never higher than 60% of the GDP)  
 
3. Exchange Rates: "the observance of the normal fluctuation margins 
provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European 
Monetary System, for at least two years, without devaluing against the 
currency of any other Member State." After transition to stage three of 
EMU, the European Monetary System was replaced by the new 
exchange-rate mechanism, ERM II. This is meant to give newly aspirants 
to integrate to the EMU the same institutional procedure like already 
established members have undergone. 
 
4. Long-term interest rates: "the durability of convergence achieved 
by the Member State [...] being reflected in the long-term interest-rate 
levels". 
 
Clearly, these criteria are based on a monetarist conception strongly relying on 
equilibriums models of economy, and thus pointing the path of the European neoliberal 
project in a globalizing world. In this way EMU might be understood as part of a 
neoliberal world order, reflecting “a strategy for reconciling regional integration with 
globalizing forces” (Gill 2001; 52) 
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With these agreements and norms the ideas of deregulation, free market, and non-
interventionist state were implemented. Particularly the idea of non-intervention by the 
state is obvious, since measures as listed above restrict possibilities to use fiscal policies 
for counter-cyclical interventions. After ECC, only in exceptional cases policies not 
according to monetarist models could be realized. In general, in order to overcome 
recessions or weak economic performance, states now had to adapt to monetary policies 
in neoliberal shape. This is to say that strategies of devaluation in times of increasing 
deficits in balance of payments, as well as the option to print money and bail out or 
subsidize key sectors of production were not anymore options. 
Moreover, likewise the global neoliberal project of internationalization did before 
in other occasions, the treaty separated monetary policies from domestic politics, stating 
an ‘independence’ of the ECB. Independency hereby is to mean that the ECB after ECC 
solely had to focus on controlling inflation rates. To adhere to the agreements is 
therefore to give international rules and dynamics priority over domestic policies. Gill 
(2001) calls this phenomena neo-Constitutionalism. This neo-Constitutionalism was the 
newly introduced neoliberal framework for a state’s international relation government. 
In the end, with the ECC, decisions of political economic range were dissociated from 
democratic accountability “in order to make governments more responsive to the 
discipline of market forces, and correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic 
forces and processes. New constitutionalism is the politico-legal dimension of the wider 
discourse of disciplinary neo-liberalism” (Gill, 2001; 47). 
Incorporation of not directly profiting classes and groups into the Neoliberal 
project has been achieved through the ideology of free markets and ‘credit card debt’ 
(Crouch 2008). To start with the former, markets were said not only to have the optimal 
economic outcomes, but also to be politically the most justice institution mankind could 
have. Intellectuals like Hayek and Friedman elaborated on this ideology of the neoliberal 
historical bloc. To put it very short, preferences were said to be subjective, and therefore 
prices on markets where so, too. The justice way of price formation, then, was to let 
markets reflect subjective preferences and see until which point another one substituted 
a primary preference. For example, unemployment was said to be a preferred individual 
choice, which could have been maintained as long as other preferences than free time 
rose (food, shelter, entertainment, etc. pp.) and thus let an individual chose to accept 
work. Only process like these were seen and propagated as being truly liberal, in the 
sense of liberalizing the subject from exogenous coercion.  
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In sum, it can be claimed that ‘the rationale for the EMU is based upon orthodox market-
monetarist assumptions concerning the conduct of economic policy’ (Gill 2001, 57). 
How, then, did the neoliberal project secure employment in Europe? Far from agreeing 
with the ECB, this project work has a converse take on the neoliberal ability to assure 
employment. Neoliberal Europe did in no time secure effective demand and 
employment. When effective demand actually did clear markets, it was due to other 
effects than price stability and rational behaviors. At the very beginning,  ‘during the 
1980s (or 1990s, depending on when the neo-liberal wave hit a particular economy) the 
answer [to unemployment] first appeared to be a negative one, as rising unemployment 
and continuing recession became the dominant experience’ (Crouch 2008, 481). What 
afterwards gave employment rates its positive push, has not much to do with effective 
and rational markets, but with the privatization of what has been under Keynesianism 
the primary role of the state, namely going into debt in order to stimulate consumption.  
 What actually drove material growth and employment in the Neoliberal age can 
be called ‘privatized Keynesianism’ (Crouch 2008), driven mainly by increasing prices of 
houses, especially in the United States (US). ‘As we now know, two things came together 
to rescue the neo-liberal model from the instability that would otherwise have been its 
fate: the growth of credit markets for poor and middle-income people, and of derivates 
and futures markets among the very wealthy’ (ibid. 481). Schwartz described the 
importance of the housing market for the global political economy more broadly than 
here possible to discuss (2009). Basically, the argument is ‘that growth premium [in the 
U.S.] originated from the different capacities of housing finance systems to translate 
disinflation and foreign capital into increased aggregated demand and economic growth’ 
(Schwartz 2009, 13). In other words, the housing market in the US served as a ‘normal 
process of Keynesian demand stimulus’ (ibid. 2). This stimulus not only enabled over 
average growth in the US, but to a whole international community of ‘Amercanized rich’ 
(ibid. 52-82) countries. 
Pushing Schwartz argument a little further it can be said that the effect, which 
created wealth in several countries during neoliberal reign, was an inflationary one. By 
provision of cheap money through the Federal Reserve System (FED), financial markets 
were able to grow drastically (Elsenhans 2001), hence the ever increasing prices on 
assets. But, within the neoclassical view such an inflationary process is hardly 
theoretically graspable. To accept assets value increase as a form of inflation would have 
been a contradiction to main assumptions on markets that drove theory behind 
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Neoliberalism. Expansionary money provision on markets for goods lead to inflationary 
prices, therefore money provision is at some point rejected by consumers who are 
interested to consume the value of their wages in filth, the basic inflationary principle 
remains the same with goods as with assets. Only assets do not loose value through time 
in inflation, but increase. Goods loose value in inflation, but  ‘this is not the case with 
assets, things that do not lose there value that way: real property, financial holdings, 
some art objects. A rise in their price is simultaneously a rise in their value, and does not 
contribute to [price] inflation’ (Crouch 2008, 482). Expansionary money policies by the 
FED in the US, together with ‘Time machines’ for money is what made it finally possible 
for the neoliberal project to decuple growth from wage incomes, giving financializitaion 
a steady increasing role for the Gross domestic product (GDP) in several countries 
during the last two decades, as reflected for different regional financialization within the 
EMU in the graph below, which reflects the stock value of listed companies in the Stock 
Exchange in relation to GDP of countries in and out of Europe.
 
Figure 4, Share of Asset Value on GDP, source:  Tridico 2012, 28. 
According to Tridico, a ‘trend of hyperfinancialization [taking off in the US] spread 
around the world, first to Europe, then to emerging markets’ (2012, 26). Unfortunately, 
the resources of the project work do not allow rendering the available data into a 
measure of the EMU. But considering that a wide range of EMU member states reflect 
significant increases by share of finance on GDP, the available data already suggests a 
representative trend also for the European level the project work has token so far. 
Unsurprisingly, a non EMU member state takes away the pole position in financialization 
of GDP share: Switzerland. But this is only in relative terms. Since GDP in US and United 
Kingdom (UK) exceed that of Switzerland, absolute financialization is highest in these 
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two countries. After these non EMU states, also European countries like Portugal, 
Greece, Spain France and Sweden have experienced a dramatic increase of finance value 
in their GDP during 1988 and 2006.   
With the rise of finance throughout the globe and Europe there are two points 
of importance. One is that investments into production become less and less attractive 
when returns of asset holdings are higher. Thus, the before hand discussed non-neutral 
role of money comes into play, possibly causing unemployment. On the other hand 
services and production that before would not have been financed due to their 
uncompetitive returns can now grow. Hence the ever-growing house prices in the US. 
This sets a differing frame of competition, in which investments are not so much 
dependent on the actual material beneficiary for society, but on the increase of value 
due to attracting more and more liquid assets. Investments then come down to the 
‘beauty contest’ once described by Keynes. If assets could be compared with beauty, and 
markets were to find out who is the most beautiful, in financial markets it is finally not 
about finding the most beautiful, but about the one of whom the majority might come to 
think that it would be the one chosen also by the others. Consequently, those nearest to 
the rumors on where and when to invest (whom to choose) will take away the highest 
returns. Thus, Ridicos observation that high financialization comes together with a high 
Gini coefficient does not surprise too much (ibid.). It reflects the by different authors 
mentioned rise of rent seeking strategies under neoliberal globalization (Elsenhans 
2000; 2004; Gill 1998; 2001) 
As long as it lasted, the credit driven global Keynesian stimulus trough housing 
markets, strongly intertwined with financialization, was able to reduce unemployment. 
Consumption through credit, altogether with over average growth rates through 
increased investment returns in the US, positively effected unemployment rates and 
trickled down the incomes of global trade. This global Keynesian stimulus through 
housing markets, emerging from a deregulated market system, crucially, lacked one 
feature: an institution to secure market failures not to have the reverse effect in times of 
liquidity shortage than the market euphoria has in times of liquidity flow. Believe in the 
almighty capacity of markets let any form of regulation in the hands of the very same 
system that also provided the needed demand for global production (Davidson 2009, 
Stieglitz 2009, Kaletsky 2011). Thus, the financial crisis, arising with the failure of 
Lehman Brothers, locked away the very mechanism with which economic performance 
was gathered during the last decades. To put it simply, privatized Keynesianism is as 
 39 
unpredictable as the beauty contest, and Neoliberalism is a strategy depending on 
market euphoria. Financialzation, together with the developments of real estate 
markets, allowed consumption as long as the ‘animal spirits’ drove it that way, 
particularly through private loans and mortgages. With the rise of crisis, euphoria 
vanished, as banks were not capable to evaluate the situation, and lost any grasp on 
where to invest. Thus, they stuttered in providing credit. Credit, which before allowed 
the needed consumption of goods, produced in globalized supply networks. 
The historical structure of pre-crisis Neoliberalism in Europe can then be 
described as followed. Due to the dominating interests of globally oriented industrials 
and financiers, Europe experienced an monetary integration into transnational 
institutions, which rely on neoclassical orthodox assumptions on Money. Thus sate 
intervention and public spending in general was to be consolidated by EMU member 
states. Through the establishment of considerable growth rates through a global 
demand stimulus by private credit, unemployment particularly in Europe tended to 
decrease. The ideology reflecting these developments can be described as an optimistic 
reliance on markets, expressed through ‘financialization’ and deregulation. The ideology 
referred to the power of market as a fair and productive way of distribution of scarce 
resources. Thus, regulation from governments was seen as only being capable to harm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neoliberalism 
Marketization 
Credit-driven 
growth 
Figure 5, Triad of Soical Forces under Neoliberalism, source: 
own development. 
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(b) Neoliberalism in crisis  
 
The optimism towards 
the neoliberal project 
underestimated those 
processes, which already 
hinted towards the limits 
of it.  Wages in the 
classical consumption 
markets declined. 
Especially in the former 
main absorber market for global production, the US, ‘any kind of average of real 
earnings since 1970 tends to show stagnation or decline of real earnings’ (Froud et al. 
2012, 154), thus credit consumption rose to become the key for growth as described 
above. The graph in Figure 6 reflects an adjusted wage share for total economy from 
1981 2011, as percent of GDP as current factor cost. Compared with the rise of share in 
financialization of GDP (Figure 5), the transformation of economies under Neoliberalism 
becomes apparent. It was a transformation of wage consumption to financial asset 
consumption. Wages stopped not only to be a central concern of politics (Levin-
Waldeman 2011s), but decreased in slowly in their economic importance with the re-
globalization of production. Rent seeking transnational production networks (Narr & 
Schubert 1995; Kaplinsky 2007; Gereffi et al. 2005; Ravenhill 2012, 345-360) were 
taking advantage of newly accessible labor ‘reserve armies’ after Perestroika, therefore 
driving down work costs, as workers had to compete now on global scale. This 
competition for cheap labor prices was enforced politically by strategies of devaluating 
exchange rates in developing countries (Elsenhans 2006), especially in China. Finally 
also the reduction of income producing investments through financialization (Elsenhans 
2000; Bello 2006; Tridico 2012) drove down wage prices, since more and more labor 
became available in the former core industrial countries, hence, as labor was 
oversupplied, it became cheap. But this process comes with an inner contradiction, since 
it challenges the reproduction of effective demand on global, and finally also European 
scale. This contradiction did not come to appearance before, because it had been 
covered by financialization and credit provision in financial euphoria. Crisis of under-
Figure 6, Development of Wage Shares on GDP, source: 
Euromemorandum 2011, 17. 
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consumption was then a logical outcome of lacking credit provision with the downturn 
of this euphoria.   
With the collapse of the credit driven demand markets starting in the US, global 
economy was left with an oversupply of goods, leading straight into recession. Since the 
burst of the real estate bubble in the United States, the global reach of the crisis became 
more and more apparent. What was revealed was not so much an isolated happening, 
effecting solely miss leaded US markets for loans and ‘toxic’ mortgages, but the 
nowadays globally strongly intertwined flows of capital, production and consumption. 
The underline of the firs part of analysis has been that the recession 2008-9 was not so 
much an outcome only due to a momentum of momentary credit crunch, but that crisis 
revealed a more general tendency within global political economy. This tendency is the 
tendency of over-supply on a global scale, seeking for an ever-decreasing purchasing 
power at local markets for consumption. But, for the good of the neoliberal project, 
consumption was enhanced by a complex system of credit provision for consumption 
during the last decade. ‘Such a model of consumption is, however, unstable, as the 
financial crash of 2007 showed (Tridico 2012, 29). Thus, under-consumption shapes 
today’s global political economy of transnational supply chain networks, penetrating the 
major markets for consumption, without generating sufficient effective demand to 
guarantee a sustainable path of global growth.  
In Europe, the neoliberal project enforced under-cosnumption by the very 
neoliberal project of monetary integration: ‘the ECB’s single monetary policy is one of 
the factors underlying the decline in the long-term trend of economic growth in the 
Eurozone’ (Lacina & Kapounek 2010, 40). With the collapse of the housing market in the 
US, unemployment in Europe has then also been affected directly in the aftermath of 
Lehman Brothers, reflected in the dramatic increase after 2008 in Figure 1. Unlike the 
burst of the so-called dot.com bubble in 2001 or the Asian financial crisis in the 90s’, the 
collapse of the housing market in the US triggered a global recession in 2008-9. Soon 
after this breaking point in 2008, unemployment rates in Europe rose dramatically. Even 
though unemployment rates differ from country to country, they still are between 4 and 
23 per cent throughout all 27 European state members (Eurostat 2012), and therefore 
mass unemployment can be stressed to be a challenge with European range.  
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According to the Keynesian understanding of crisis this project work stresses, 
likewise unemployment, demand in Europe proved to be highly vulnerable towards the 
happenings in the financial crisis. Figure 7 sows a graph on the development of domestic 
demand in the Eurozone from 1996 to 2012, figured 
in millions of euro. As can be seen, despite reasons 
to speculate on a recovery in the aftermath of crisis, 
today Europe faces uncertainty in the further 
economic developments. ‘There were signs of 
domestic demand taking over as the engine of a 
moderate recovery of the European economy, 
despite fiscal tightening and weakening global 
conditions.’ Unfortunate for the neoliberal project in Europe, though, ‘These hopes were 
dashed.’ (Buti 2011, 11). To analyze the link in between the developments of demand in 
Europe and unemployment rates on European level, the comparative methodology can 
now be applied.  
The cases Spain and Portugal, representing a set of most similar systems, 
experienced both rising unemployment since the impact of crisis. Germany on the other 
hand represents a system of most difference, showing a rise in employment (Eurostat 
2012). If all three cases are questioned 
for the variable of domestic demand, it 
results that Germany is the only system 
with a rising index of domestic demand. 
Figure 8 reflects the developments of 
domestic demand in central national 
economies in the Eurozone from 1999 to 
2011, where 1999 represents one, and 
any divergence can be measured as 
relative development to this juncture. The following picture becomes apparent: 
Germany is the only country in which domestic demand is rising, although only slightly. 
Both other countries see a sharp reduction of domestic demand. According to the 
theoretical approach taken in this project work, empirical data then also suggests for the 
cases of interests that one necessary condition for unemployment seems to be the 
demise of domestic demand. Or, to generalize, demise of domestic demand on European 
level is likely to provoke a further rise in unemployment rates on European scale. Thus, 
Figure 7, Development of Demand in 
the Eurozone, source ECB 2012. 
Figure 8, Development of Demand by EMU Member 
States, source: Mayer 2012, 1 
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after crisis, the Neoliberal actions are to be analyzed in their role to effect demand 
throughout Europe. 
Another effect important to see when discussing diverging employment rates, is that 
housing market driven demand creation guaranteed export-led growth driven countries 
to sell their products to the US and its perceivers. Since the post world war two era, 
export led growth economies like Germany and Japan (Schwartz 2010, 177-218), and 
later China (Amiti & Freund 2008), were reliant on US demand for imported products. 
But, especially for Germany, EMU also became more and more important to sell export 
goods to. Abandoning any currency 
barriers within the EMU state 
members fostered this process. 
Without any exchange rates managing 
in and outflows of capital, countries 
like Sweden and Germany were able 
to maintain high trade surpluses, and 
still had not deal with any sort of 
currency price increases. This lead to 
big gaps of balance of payments within the EMU (see figure 9, representing the 
developments of balance of payments since 2003 in million Euro), while the balance of 
payments of the EMU with the rest of the world stayed in a relative balance. Besides the 
reliance on credit provision in some countries, a strong orientation towards demand in 
the foreign in other countries, were underlying tendencies within the neoliberal project 
of globalization This led to a careless neglect of strategies to foster domestic demand 
(Elsenhans 2004; Bello 2006; Kaletsky 2011; Tridico 2012). Unfortunately, the limited 
frame and the resources of the project work do not allow discussing the particular 
developments of domestic labor markets in the EMU. But, as can be seen in figure 9 the 
most similar systems Spain and Portugal both deal with a deficit, while Germany, the 
most different system, benefits from a surplus in balance of payments. Thus, a further 
precondition for unemployment rates seems to be set by deficits in the balance of 
payments, or, the other way around, under the rule of European monetary integration, 
balance of payment surpluses might be found to be a necessary condition for rising 
employment rates. Crucially, the development in payment imbalances is not simply 
reversible by export strategies, as Mayer states in his analysis: ‘Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain do not appear sufficiently price sensitive to achieve external balance though 
Figure 9, Increasing Imbalances in Payments between 
EMU Member States, source: Mayer 2012, 5. 
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relative price changes. Hence, adjustment in these countries will have to come mainly 
from changes in domestic demand’ (Mayer 2012, 7). But, as Mayer already concluded, 
this path is rather difficult to take for the cases of high unemployment in the EMU, and 
thus domestic demand remains the main variable of interest.  
By this comparison the following can be stated: Employment in neoliberal Europe 
is dependent on developments in domestic demand, which is currently in demise. 
European crisis management had, if conscious on it or not, to cope with the global 
challenges of under-consumption threats. Furthermore, European economic 
development was strongly intertwined with the global trends of past decades. Especially 
the economies of states in the periphery of the Eurozone were integrated through the 
very same neoliberal paradigm of self-sufficient markets that kept going the 
developments on global scale. Moreover, even in economic leading countries like 
Germany, scarcity of domestic demand gave export led growth a key role, letting 
production orient towards the demand created by financialization and housing markets. 
The collapse of the financial system brought about huge negative implications for the 
labor market. As unemployment rose, public spending increased significantly. When the 
financialization euphoria collpased in the fall of 2008, financiers have been in a rush to 
secure assets to backup a portfolio for banks, which in their eyes might reflect a solid 
equity. Thus, within these already challenging times, a higher discrimination line in 
credit provision became apparent, letting public debt become difficult to be refunded.  
After crisis, social systems in different European countries have not only been 
under increased stress with rising unemployment, and interest rates for public debt, 
EMU also took collective action to bail out banks. To overcome a deadlock in 
investments and consumption after Lehman breakdown, and to avoid letting economies 
slip into a cycle of ever deepening recession, states throughout OECD did what they 
were supposed to avoid by nearly any economic policy formulated during the last 
decades. Banks were bailed out and revitalized by providing money. Stimulus packages 
rose domestic demand, especially in Germany. (Hodson 2010; 2011). Expansionary 
monetary policies where accompanied by active involvement in refunding public debt, 
partly by completely new installed institutions in the EMU. While the cases of Germany 
and Spain still handle crisis in a rather domestic way, the case of Portugal exemplifies 
the collective take on crisis management in the EMU, which stand contrary to the 
findings of the here undertaken analysis.  
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Since first EMU member states like Greece Ireland and Portugal faced major 
problems to sell state bounds on financial markets in the aftermath of 2008, EMU 
member states decided financial to safeguard financial stability. In order to do so EMU 
created the EFSF. This new institution was established following decisions taken within 
the Ecofin Council on 9 May 2010. The most important objectives of the new institution 
are, according to its own website, to provide loans to countries in ‘financial difficulties‘, 
intervene in the debt markets, and finance recapitalizations of financial institutions 
through loans to governments. Portugal stands here as one example of how this new 
kind of institution is thought to manage crisis.  To accomplish its mission, the EFSF can 
issue bonds or other debt instruments on the capital markets, and therefore provide the 
funds needed to give out loans to countries in financial troubles. It even can recapitalize 
banks or directly buy sovereign debt bounds. The latter actually goes against central 
axioms of neoliberal monetary policies in EMU so far, but has been justified by referring 
to to the exceptionality of crisis. The EFSF is thus an institution demonstrating the range 
of possible monetary policies, which in outer-crisis times do not come into consideration 
under Neoliberalism. 
This slight change in economic management on European scale already drove 
hardliners out of the ECB. A former chief economic of the ECB, Jürgen Stark, expressed 
his concerns on EMU policies after leaving his office in December 2011. In his view, the 
involvement of the ECB into public dept refunding was specifically not that problematic 
because it would lead straight into inflation. But the intervention of the ECB might 
create what neoclassic school calls a ‘moral hazard’. By cheapening the price for 
refunding debt below market set prices, Stark fears the possibility that governments 
could get to bail out policies (FAZ 2011). Already the chance that European economic 
government would not longer be bound to act strictly in patterns of neoclassical market 
rationality is repulsive to an ideology like the one represented by Stark. For neoclassical 
hardliners like Stark, the actions taken by governments in the aftermath of 2008 to 
facilitate public debt refunding disturbed the ‘rationality’ of the market process.  
Stark might find himself to have overestimated European ambitions lo leave 
neoliberal monetary policies. Before a country in financial problems receives any 
support, it has to be approved by technocratic government, called the Eurogroup. This 
group, then, is a committee of the different finance ministers in the euro area. Any 
decision taken in the EFSF has to be negotiated in between the finance ministers, 
representatives of the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF). This so-called Troika sets then the programs, which are supposed to help out 
states with problems in refunding public debt. In short, support programs coming from 
the EFSF are set up by professionalized representatives, meeting in the Troika to 
elaborate on ideas for countries in difficulty. Crucially, EFSF loans are subjected to 
conditions: “any financial assistance to a country in need is linked to strict policy 
conditions which are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the 
country in need and the European Commission” (EFSF-faq).  
In the Portugal’s memorandum of understanding it is possible to find concrete 
‘strictly policy conditions’. It includes, inter alia, 5% average cut in sector wages in 2011, 
wages and pensions freeze in 2012 and 2013, a reduction of public workers (1% in both 
2012 and 2013), and suspend large infrastructure programs, as well as an increase in 
consumption taxes (revise reduced value added tax rates, introduce electricity tax etc.). 
It also makes reference to a privatization program, which includes transports, energy, 
communications and insurance public enterprises. With respect to labor market, the 
memorandum purposes reducing the severance payments for new contracts to 10 days 
per year of tenure and revise it for current employees, besides redefining the collective 
agreements. Moreover, the memorandum agrees on a reduction of the maximum 
duration of unemployment insurance benefits to no more than 18 months, and 
introduces a declining profile of benefits after six months of unemployment. Such 
policies were supposed to reduce Portugal economic problems provoking to let 
unemployment rise from 12.3 to 14.8 per cent in 2012 (Eurostat 2012), and letting slip 
domestic demand for five indicator points, as reflected in figure 8. Thus, in terms of 
unemployment, neoliberal austerity measures appear to be contra productive. 
In general, papers published by the EU since crisis follow this commitment to 
neoliberal paradigms and unemployment provoking strategies. For example, the 
European semester, which “is a six-month period every year during which the member 
states’ budgetary and structural policies will be reviewed to detect any inconsistencies 
and emerging imbalances.” Its intention is “to reinforce the coordination while major 
budgetary decisions are still under preparation” (Council of the European Union, 09-09-
2010). These interim processes start in January, when the Commission publishes the 
Annual Growth Survey that is discussed in March by the European Council. In this Spring 
Council, EMU states members identify the main challenges and give strategic advice on 
policies. Then, in April, the member states review their budgetary strategies and adopt, 
if an agreement on needs for it establishes, national reforms. Finally, in June and July, the 
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European Council and the Council of ministers provide policy advice for the following 
year budgets (Council of the European Union, 07-09-2010). By this process can be seen 
that the European semester is a surveillance pact according to the neoliberal project of 
Neo-constitutionalism, where, once more, EMU member states’ accountability refers 
towards the European legislation, and not towards domestic citizenship.  
Another agreement signed by Euro area Heads of state (and an wider European 
association) is the Euro plus pact (also called the Pact for the Euro). Aiming to 
“strengthen the economic pillar of the monetary union, achieve a new quality of 
economic policy coordination [and] improve competitiveness” (European Council, 20-
04-2011; 14) this pact is a commitment of signing states for undertaking specific 
national commitments every year, prioritizing policy areas that, according to European 
Council, are essential for fostering competitiveness and convergence. In line with the 
existing economic governance, and building on the existing instruments as the European 
Semester or the Stability and Growth Pact, signing states are then to commit economic 
polices to respect the integrity of the Single Market. Its goals orbit around: 1) fostering 
competitiveness, and reducing (if it is need) wages in order to maintain unit labor costs 
and increase productivity and efficiency. This can include a review of collective 
bargaining processes, and public sector wages. 2) Foster employment through 
“flexicurity” and tax reforms. 3) Enhance the sustainability of public finances with 
reforms that could include the retirement age, and national fiscal rules based on the 
European Stability and Growth Pact. 4) Reinforce the financial stability, monitoring the 
private debt of banks, households and non-financial firms (ibid. 15-20). 
Goals 1 and 3 are perfectly identifiable as neoliberal, as they seek for a 
deregulation of the economy, limiting the power of trade unions since wage flexibility is 
seen as only viable way out of crisis. Also possible state interventions into economy are 
rather blocked than enforced by this agreement. According neoclassical economics, such 
measures increase the employment; nevertheless, current situation in Europe 
contradicts these assumptions as the case of Portugal has shown so far. The second goal 
is linked to the just-in-time mode of production, and the “flexicurity” consequences are 
described by Richard Sennett (Sennett, 1998). Goal number 4 is maybe not in line with 
the neoliberal ideology, but is necessary to bear in mind the consequences of the 
financial crisis. At least the fourth goal is s not contradictory with Neoliberalism, since it 
enforces monitoring, and not control or limiting the private sector. In sum, the Euro Plus 
Pact is a Commitment for apply the general guidelines adopted at European level during 
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the last decades in a national level, highlighting the competitiveness of the Euro area 
into the Single Market Framework. Its assumption to improve the employment situation 
is only one: deregulation. 
 Most recently, in December 2011, the European Council decided to replace the 
EFSF by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). This change will be realized as soon 
as the member states as the EMU ratify this legislative decision on European level. To 
“make it [the ESM] more effective” (European Council, 9-05-2011), the new agreement 
agrees more radically to neoliberal ideology, as it is “strictly adhere to the well 
established IMF principles and practices” (European Council, 9-12-2011, 6). The new 
treaty also “technocratizes” economic governance even more than the Troika has 
already been: “[…] voting rules in the ESM will be changed to include an emergency 
procedure. The mutual agreement rule will be replaced by a qualified majority of 85% in 
case the Commission and the ECB conclude that an urgent decisions related to financial 
assistance is needed” (ibid.). Furthermore, countries, which want to apply to ESM-aid, 
must sign the so-called “fiscal compact”. 
One of the most important agreements in the fiscal compact is on the government 
budgets. It must be balanced or in surplus, its ‘annual structural deficit’ cannot exceed 
0’5% of GDP. Such rule has to be introduced at constitutional level in each country 
(European Council, 31-01-2012). Furthermore, following the current ‘Neo-
Constitutional’ situation, the EU Court of Justice will be able to verify national 
transposition of the balanced budget rule, and its decision can be sanctioned by a 
penalty (press note 02-03-2012). This shows that the newly institutionalized 
accountability of the states moves towards supranational institutions, and away from 
citizens. The press release to introduce the so-called ‘reinforced’ Stability and Growth 
Pack (EU 2011 SGP) sates that the new agreements are due to crisis, which ‘has 
exacerbated the pressure on the finances of EU Member States’ (ibid.). So the European 
answer to this is a ‘comprehensive reinforcement of economic government in the EU and 
the euro area since the launch of the Economic Momentary Union almost 20 years ago’ 
(ibid.). Consequently, what can be found within the SGP is the already well-known 
neoliberal economic government, just more anxious in its realization. In practice, it 
blocks the utilization of the public debt as a tool to execute counter-cyclical measures in 
times of recession. Moreover, it establishes the dismantling the Welfare State because 
prevents any public policy in years of crisis, as it limits the capacity of financing the state 
where its revenues fall. In sum, the agreement is a reintroduction of the same policies 
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that served as cornerstones for the neoliberal project of Europe. Main underline is an 
economic discipline of states, and a trust in self‐fixing market forces. Only through 
believe of neoclassical economics can the ‘six pack’ be presented as ‘restoring confidence 
and preventing future crisis in the euro and the EU’ (SGP) 
 Besides a stricter control and sanctioning of public debt and deficit spending of 
member states by the EU, the memo also states that macroeconomic imbalances have to 
be resolved more progressively. If imbalances are found to be ‘serious’ the ‘Member 
State concerned will have to submit a corrective action plan with clear roadmap and 
deadlines for implementing corrective actions’ (ibid.) As these corrective actions cannot 
mean any state intervention exceeding the limits of public deficits allowed, austerity is 
the only left option for such ‘corrective actions’. When the option of demand stimuli is 
ruled out, neoliberal governments solely can adopt to a trend of its national economy, 
cutting down public spending. In the end this is to say that public policies encouraging 
employment creation cannot be practiced, since EMU member states have to consolidate 
there due to the agreements of the fiscal pact.  
The European commission thus presented its answer to the challenges arising 
with crisis. The so‐called six‐pack is supposed to be implemented by any state member 
throughout this year. The policies formulated in December 2011 do not only reflect the 
already known ideologies of monetarism and governmental restraint of neoliberal 
ideology, they also have their effect on crisis management. These measures are 
presented for reducing public sectors, and its possible range for actions to overcome 
recession with anti-cyclical policies that could raise employment with public investment. 
Clearly, neoliberal ideology is apparent in this agreement, reducing the competence of 
EMU member states in economic issues. The neoliberal take on macro-economic 
imbalances reduction is apparent with the installation of financial sanctions, when a 
EMU country experiences an ‘excessive’ balance 
of payment deficit, or when it exceeds the public 
debt benchmark, altogether with new 
expenditure benchmarks, and a new 
surveillance by the Commission given with the 
so-called enforcement mechanism (more 
sanctions if a country can reach the objectives). 
Paradoxically, though, because ‘weaker 
Figure 10, Shrinking Profit Returns in the 
EMU, source European Comission 2011. 
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prospects for trade and domestic demand for 2012 will reduce firms incentive to invest’ 
(EU forecast 2012, 9), also profitability gets weak in Europe, see figure 10.  Thus the 
project of the Neoliberal class to establish accumulation friendly political frames seems 
to be endangered by the very own logic of economic governance. Through the 
implementation of public spending cuts and reduction of social services, under 
consumption gets enforced. Unemployment rates are then solely dependent on market 
outcomes in Europe, which are still depressed since 2008. 
Global political economy, for so long, misses a demand stimulus with the range 
that the housing market has had during the last decades has been found. After having 
lost the engine of economic growth of last decades, global political economy, until today, 
awaits a new generation of demand stimulus. Also advocates of China’s rising power 
come to understand that policies to foster domestic demand face sever difficulties 
(World Bank 2012). Despite the realized necessity of state intervention and modest 
coordination for regulation in financial markets by the U.S. and Europe in the advent of 
recession, a ‘global response’ towards crisis failed (Stieglitz 2010, 212pp.). Without any 
institution to replace the loss of effective demand creation by the housing market, global 
as well as European growth seems doomed to stay in depression. As no positive long-
term trend is at hand, current investments, and therefore growth expectations, remain 
low (Hockett et al 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now critics draw the following picture of today’s Neoliberal Europe: ‘the phoney “aid 
plans” – aimed to rescue the banks, and not the population – have led to the destruction 
of 300.000 jobs in 18 months in Greece; a drop in wages of 30% and a diminution of its 
GDP by 5%. Unemployment continues to increase to reach 12.3% in Portugal (Eurostat), 
14.5%in Ireland and 16% in Greece in the second quarter of 2011’ (Gauthier 2011, 33). 
European economic government today is contested, and therefore lacks broad support 
Neoliberalism 
Austerity 
Under-
consumption 
Figure 11, Triad of Neoliberal Europe in Crisis, source: own 
development 
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for recent policies, most apparent on the public squares in Madrid and Athens (see 
transform! 2011- 87-98), but also on the streets on Frankfurt on 19th of May. 
Nevertheless, so far a  ‘collective understanding’ of austerity drives institutions in 
Europe. The now driven strategy formulated in the fiscal compact is part of the bigger 
idea of austerity policies, which, after this analysis form part of the problem. Austerity in 
Europe nowadays can be said to aggravate unemployment. Blocking public investments 
when private economy is depressed can be taken as synonymous for causing 
unemployment; unemployment then means less incomes and more public expenditure, 
which in turn hurts again public budgets, increasing their deficit. In how far these 
understandings might be shared by those who are experiencing the outcomes of these 
policies, letting unemployment rise, has to be seen in future. What can be said from the 
analysis here is that austerity measures in context to global under-consumption since 
crisis 2008 seem to enforce rising unemployment rates in Europe, as can also be taken 
from the most recent data on unemployment in Figure 1. 
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Conclusion 
 
Through the here used eclectic critical theoretical framework it became apparent that 
the recent crisis developed throughout the neoliberal integration of states into a Europe 
wide monetary transnational management. This integration can be understood as 
neoliberal one, since interests of neoliberal finacialization drove it, transferring political 
competences over monetary policies on a transnational level with newly installed 
institutions. Within these institutions a monetary policy of price stability and fiscal 
consolidation has been fixed. Due to the neoclassical take on economics, these policies 
were supposed to guarantee employment and material growth. Preceding economic 
understandings came on an agreement to support this transformation by implementing 
straight neoliberal policies into an embedded understanding, which also allowed 
subsidies and state intervention to a certain extend.   
This embedded Neoliberalism was able to provide sufficient employment in 
order to legitimate the political changes through a global demand stimulus by increasing 
financialization and real estate speculations, supporting euphoria in finances, and finally 
credit provision for consumption. Throughout this period, rising private credit allowed 
to maintain low unemployment rates in the Eurozone and high growth rates of GDP in 
most countries. But, this system came to its collapse with increasing skepticism on the 
very dynamics triggered by the neoliberal transformation. With the end of credit 
provision for consumption, demand for global production was lacking, most apparent in 
the two cases of analysis, Spain and Portugal, but also in other EMU state members like 
Greece and Ireland.  
By implementing austerity policies, demand is now even cut down further in the 
case of Portugal. Thus, unemployment can be seen as a product of the developments 
Europe has undergone the last decades, and more specifically, under-consumption is 
fostered by neoliberal paradigms enforced by European institutions, some of them 
newly installed solely to manage crisis in this way. Austerity is represented in budgetary 
restrictions, and price stability seems to remain Europe’s medicine for any ills of 
economies. But, when the economy is in stagnated or in recession, it needs stimulus. If 
the private sector cannot drive the economy, a public sector should do so; if not done, 
problems becomes worse. In other words: in order to pay its debt at some time, states 
must secure sufficient incomes or cut down spending. If an economy is in recession, 
austerity is synonymous of more unemployment and less revenues, which means lower 
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incomes and more difficulties to pay debt, aggravating the situation the case of Portugal, 
shows and is also apparent in Ireland, Greece and Spain.  
In regard to the research question, the ambivalence between Neoliberalism in 
Europe and unemployment can be explained as followed. As long as credit provision for 
consumption is driven by euphoria, unemployment can be reduced. If credit stutters, 
under-consumption caused by neoliberal globalization is driving unemployment rates 
up. Crucially, this also means lowering profitability of production. Thus, it could be 
asked for a further research, if the nowadays-ruling elites are actually interested in 
profitability or securitization of asset value. The latter would indicate a change in the 
shape of the dominant class, since the Neoliberal dominant class was interested in 
reestablishing conditions for accumulation after crisis in the 70s’. Former, assuming the 
here presented analysis provides validity, would mean that the neoclassical paradigms 
on monetary policies block policies to counteract under-consumption in Europe. Thus, a 
neoliberal historical block confronts the dilemma of either negating the very theoretical 
assumption it is arguing on or accepts the consequences of financial outcomes such as 
possible state collapses possibly exemplified soon by Greece. But also Gramsci’s hint 
towards the possible fallacy of institutions, simply being mistaken, could be a possible 
research on how it is possible that austerity is so prevailing in Europe.    
The hegemonic historical block is losing legitimacy, and is being contested on the 
streets by many western citizens. Contradictions in the neoliberal project are every day 
more visible, as well as the consequences of market deregulation and capital 
accumulation. After two decades of predict the benefits of free trade and the all-
powerful invisible hand, governments decided to bail out banks. This first step to let go 
hard-line neoclassical policies could give motivation to rethink recent policies. But a 
Keynesian inspired policy to counteract crisis cannot simply turn back time to the 
project of national welfare states. Neither does globalization block per se Keynesian 
strategies. Crucially, though, Keynesianism under globalized exchange relations requires 
not only an global coordination of major economies, but also answers to the situation 
the most marginalized still experience today.  
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